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Other Post Employment Benefits-The Other Elephant in the Room
Catherine Plante
Department of Accounting and Finance, University of New Hampshire, United States

ABSTRACT
The governments of the fifty states of the United States have made promises to past and present employees
regarding retirement benefits-predominately pensions and healthcare coverage. The issues surrounding the
pension obligations made to these employees have been well examined but the obligations due to promises of
healthcare coverage have not received as much attention. There is great variance among the OPEB liability
reported by the states. This study examines reasons for the variance. The future payment of healthcare
obligations, like pensions, will put extreme stress on states in the future if the impact of these promises is not
understood now. Understanding the influence healthcare assumptions have on the reported liabilitites is an
important step to understanding these liabilities.
Keywords: Post-Employment Benefits (OPEB), Great Variance
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFRs)

1. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, GASB 45 Accounting and Financial
Reporting by Employers for Post-Employment Benefits
Other Than Pensions required state and local
governments to report their non-pension PostEmployment Benefits (OPEB) as liabilities on their
financial statements starting after December, 2006.
These liabilities are dominated by healthcare benefits
granted to retirees. Up until this point, state and local
governments reported the cost of these benefits on a
“pay as you go” basis.
GASB 45 required
governments, for the first time, to report the value of
healthcare promises made to retirees. The purpose of
this study is to examine the OPEB liabilities reported
by the states. The OPEB liabilities vary widely among
the states; this study examines potential causes for the
variance. States reported a total of over $638 billion
in OPEB liabilities in 2009 (PCT, 2011). It is
important that the numbers reported by the states are
accurate and reliable so good decisions regarding
funding and future benefits can be made.

1.1. Why OPEBS are Important
During 2009, states reported an average OPEB
liability of over $9 billion and growing. According to
Science Publications
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PricewaterhouseCoopers, the rate of healthcare inflation in
2008 has been close to 10% and shows no signs of
slowing down (PWC, 2008). Changes in the healthcare
laws have added uncertainty to the future of healthcare in
the United States. States are examining the retirement
benefits promised to their employees to determine if
changes are necessary. The recent upheaval in Wisconsin
shows how important benefits are to state workers and
how difficult it is to change them.
Public attention has focused on the status of states’
unfunded pensions. During 2009, a $660 billion gap
between pension liabilities and pension assets existed
(PCT, 2011). Less widely discussed is the funding
concerns caused by OPEBS. At the current time,
funding for OPEBs is not required which means there is
great potential for the gap between obligations to
retirees and the ability to pay for them to widen. In
fact, in 2009, only $31 billion had been contributed
towards the $638 billion in OPEB liability (PCT,
2011). For some states, the future financial burden for
OPEBs will be minimal; for example, Nebraska does
not offer retirees healthcare benefits. For other states
these large, unfunded liabilities will become a greater
problem in the future. For example, New York has
over $56 billion in OPEB liabilities, none of which are
funded. The requirements for governments to report
AJEBA
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a better comparison between states by controlling for
size. The importance of scaling is exhibited in Table 1.

OPEB liabilities may provide a wake-up call to many
states to the financial burden the retirement benefits
promised to past and present employees will cause to
future generations.
This study examines the OPEB liabilities reported
by state governments in order to understand differences
in the liability among the states and underlying causes
for the differences. The magnitude of these liabilities and
the financial stresses on the states makes it imperative
that the reported numbers for the OPEB liabilities are
accurate and reliable. As more and more states are faced
with crucial decisions about the ability to pay current and
future commitments while examining if and how
commitments to their employees should be changed, an
understanding of how the numbers are calculated and
how assumptions affect the calculations is necessary for
good decision making.

2.2. Variables
In 2009, variations among the OPEB liabilities per
potential retiree reported by the states are large. This
study examines the potential sources of the variation by
examining five factors. The first factor is the liability
itself and the underlying assumptions used to calculate
the liability. The second factor examined is economies
of scale. The third factor is the states’ ability to pay
while the fourth factor is the cost of healthcare faced by
the individual states. The fifth factor is the level of
benefits provided by the states to their employees. By
examining these five factors, a better understanding of
the variation in the reported liabilities and the underlying
factors related to the liability should be achieved.
The first factor examined is the OPEB liability itself.
Like pensions, the OPEB liability is based on actuarial
assumptions. Two major assumptions used for both
pensions and OPEB calculations are the discount rate
and return on investment assumption. These two
assumptions often are the same. Thirty-eight of the fortyfive states reported a discount rate/return on investment
rate. Of these thirty-eight, thirty-three assumed a rate
between 4-5%. There is very little variance among the
states regarding these assumptions. Since only thirtyeight states report this assumption and because there is
little variance among the states regarding this
assumption, it is not included in the analysis to preserve
sample size (Including these assumptions in the analysis
did not affect the results).
What makes the OPEB liability unique from the
pension liability is the third assumption-healthcare
inflation rate. The healthcare inflation rate assumption is
the rate the state assumes healthcare costs are going to
increase by in the future (no state assumes a decrease in
costs) when calculating their OPEB liability. This
healthcare inflation rate assumption is particularly
interesting because there is little guidance as to how to
determine the value. GASB 45 says that it should be
partially based on past experience but the emphasis
should be on long term future trends. This emphasis on
“crystal ball gazing” makes the healthcare assumption
particularly interesting to examine during these times of
turbulence in the healthcare industry. States with higher
assumed rates of healthcare cost increases should have
higher liabilities. In fact, as Keating and Berman (2007)
found, the assumptions made regarding healthcare
inflation rates are a cost driver to the reported liability.
The rate assumed by the states varies widely. The

2. MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1. Data
The 2009 Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports
(CAFRs) of the 50 states are examined to determine the
OPEB assumptions made when calculating the OPEB
liability. Not all states report information regarding their
OPEB in their CAFR. For example, Nebraska does not
report OPEB information because they do not offer an
OPEB plan. Thus Nebraska is not included in the sample.
Other states do not report their OPEB data either because
they are multi-employer plans and currently are not
required to report the numbers or they created an
independent trust fund that issues its own financial
statements. Requests for information were made to any
state’s OPEB plan that did not report actuarial
assumptions in their CAFR. Four states (Arizona, New
Jersey, Oklahoma and South Carolina) did not respond
and therefore are not included in the sample. Forty-five
states are included in the sample.
Of the forty-five states examined, the reported
OPEB liability varies widely from the $67 million
reported by South Dakota to the $69 billion reported by
California. However, these numbers may be misleading.
States with large numbers of potential retirees will have
larger liabilities because a larger number of people are
receiving coverage. The variable potential retirees is
calculated as the number of state employees who are
currently retired plus the number of current full time
employees which represents the number of people
covered by the plan. Using the total number of past and
present employees to scale the OPEB liability will allow
Science Publications
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healthcare inflation rate assumed by the states in 2009
varies from a rate of 6%, assumed by West Virginia to
a rate of 13.6% assumed by Idaho. Some may
question whether the healthcare rate assumed is
important. Corporations, under FASB 106, have to
report the impact of a 1% increase in the assumption
on the reported OPEB liability. Looking at the 50
largest US corporations that provide healthcare to
their retirees in 2009, a 1% increase in the healthcare
assumptions corresponds to a $215 million increase in
the liability. This analysis may be understating the

importance of the healthcare assumption because the
$215 million is based on an average OPEB liability of
$3.4 billion for corporations while the states included
in the sample have an average of $9.1 billion in OPEB
liability. Thus, the potential to overstate or understate
the OPEB liability is great. All 45 states included in
the sample reported their assumed rate of increase for
future healthcare costs. It is expected that the
healthcare assumption assumed by the states should
be positively related to the OPEB liability per
potential retiree.

Table 1. OPEB liabilities by state
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

-------------2009 OPEB liability-------------California
$ 69,351,300,000
New York
$ 56,286,000,000
Texas
$ 53,890,544.000
Thiois
$ 43,949,729,000
Ohio
$ 43,360,893,000
Michigan
$ 41,419,600,000
North Carolina
$ 33,814,515,000
Connecticut
$ 20,284,637,000
Georgin
$ 17,407,621,000
Alaska
$ 16,098,602,000
Pennsylcvania
$ 15,166,300,000
Maryland
$ 14,919,073,000
Massachusetts
$ 11,512,100,000
Alabama
$ 10,791,300,000
Louisiana
$ 8,754,555,000
Hawaii
$ 7,618,372,000
Kentucky
$ 6,362,640,000
Wahington
$ 5,830,000,000
West Virginia
$ 5,636,000,000
Delaware
$ 3,742,846,000
Florida
$ 3,321,637,000
Missouri
$ 3,226,105,000
New Hampshire
$ 3,116,916,000
New Mexico
$ 2,625,963,000
Maine
$ 2,326,834,000
Wisconsin
$ 2,043,914,000
Colorado
$ 1,874,005,000
Nevada
$ 1,865,879,000
Arkansas
$ 1,136,601,000
Tennessee
$ 1,865,809,000
Vermont
$ 1,746,879,000
Minnesota
$ 1,628,934,000
Phode island
$ 1,136,601,000
Mississppi
$ 788,189,000
Oregon
$ 727,711,000
Montana
$ 555,047,000
Lowa
$ 540,894,000
Indiana
$ 538,200,000
Idaho
$ 524,859,000
Utah
$ 493,746,000
Kansas
$ 480,752,000
Wyoming
$ 236,910,000
North Dakota
$ 174,161,000
South Dakota
$ 161,376,000
South Dakota
$ 67,100,000
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------------2009 OPEB liab/potential retiree----------Connecticut
$ 226,999
Alaska
$ 194,766
Delaware
$ 135,230
Iiiionis
$ 134,436
Michigan
$ 132,705
Hawaii
$ 126,685
North Carolina
$ 194,786
West Virginia
$ 135,230
Georgia
$ 134,436
Ohio
$ 132,705
New Hampshire
$ 126,685
Texas
$ 118,786
Maryland
$ 99,525
Alabama
$ 98,906
Masschusetts
$ 98,864
New York
$ 98,276
Vermont
$ 95,352
Califormia
$ 94,795
Louisiana
$ 92,128
Maine
$ 85,582
Kentucky
$ 85,510
Pennsylvania
$ 72,394
New Mexico
$ 69,349
Nevada
$ 60,414
Washington
$ 54,125
Virginia
$ 53,694
Rhode island
$ 43,280
Missouri
$ 36,715
Arkansas
$ 36,665
Colorado
$ 27,489
Wisconsin
$ 22,021
Montana
$ 19,515
Idaho
$ 17,478
Tennsessee
$ 14,563
Florida
$ 12,520
Mississippi
$ 11,335
Utah
$ 11,146
North Dakot
$ 10,123
Wyoring
$ 6,645
Mnnesota
$ 6,395
Lowa
$ 6,222
Oregon
$ 6,214
Idiana
$ 4,536
Kansas
$ 2,488
South Dakota
$ 2,379
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states are unwilling or unable to fund their pensions, they
may be unwilling or unable to offer more healthcare
coverage to their employees and/or require the
employees to cover more of their insurance premiums
which decreases their liabilities. This variable should be
negatively related to the OPEB liability. The fourth
variable is the state’s contributions toward their OPEB
liability in 2009. Theoretically, states with higher
liabilities should be contributing more towards them. If
a state has the resources to fund their obligations, they
may be more likely to grant their employees higher
benefits. It is predicted that contributions will be
positively related to the liability.
The fourth factor that may explain the differences
among the states’ liabilities is the cost of healthcare
itself. Some parts of the country may have higher
healthcare costs than other parts. Looking at a state’s
expenditures on healthcare may be related to state
employee healthcare costs faced by the states but may
also reflect the generosity of the state in paying
healthcare costs for the poor and the elderly of their
states. The purpose of this study is to explain the
differences in reported healthcare liabilities for public
employees and retirees and not how much states are
expending on healthcare for all. The state’s healthcare
expenditures cannot be broken into employees’
expenditures and overall expenditures. Therefore, to
proxy for the differences in the cost of providing
healthcare to state employees among the states, a
variable “insurance premiums” is used. This variable is
the average cost in each state of purchasing healthcare
insurance for family coverage in the year 2009. This
variable reflects differences in healthcare costs among
states. If healthcare costs are higher in New York, the
premium for healthcare insurance should be higher. This
variable proxies for differences in healthcare costs
among the states and should be positively related to the
OPEB liability.
The fifth factor is differences in healthcare liabilities
may exist because of differences in the benefits given to
retirees. States that provide more generous healthcare
plans should have higher healthcare liabilities than states
that provide more modest coverage. To measure the
amount of the healthcare benefits provided to state
employees, the percentage of the government employees
that are covered by a collective bargaining agreement is
used. It is assumed that the more unionized the
employees are, the better the benefits they will receive.
Historically, unionization and better benefits have been
related (Buchmueller et al., 2002). Although many
states are currently negotiating with their public unions

An economy of scale is the second factor that may
explain the differences in the liability per potential
retiree reported among the states. The number of
potential retirees in the state may indicate economies
of scale exist with states with more employees having
a benefit over states with fewer employees. Taking
this idea one step further-the number of potential
retirees per population may also indicate whether
economies of scale exist within the state employees’
healthcare plans. The percentage of people that are
employed by the state measures whether states employ
a larger number of workers relative to the state’s
overall population or whether they run leaner
operations. States with a higher percentage of state
employees may enjoy economies of scale because of
their political clout. If a larger proportion of the
state’s population works for the state, for example,
that may give the states’ benefit officers greater power
to negotiate better terms for their healthcare plans.
The two variables, states’ potential retirees and the
percent of the state’s population that are potential
retirees, should be negatively related to the cost per
person if the states are enjoying economies of scale.
Additionally, because 2009 was a recession year and
therefore may skew the number of state employees, the
percent change in the number of state employees from
2005-2009 is also included as a control variable. No
prediction as to sign for this variable is made.
The third factor that may explain the differences in
the reported liabilities among the states may be the
differences in their ability to pay for healthcare for their
retirees. Poorer states may have to offer more barebones plans than states with more resources. The ability
of a state to pay for healthcare is measured using several
variables. The first variable is the per capita income of
the state’s population. The assumption is that richer
taxpayers lead to higher taxes thereby giving states
greater ability to offer more generous plans than states
with poorer taxpayers that may require more government
services. Per capita income is expected to be positively
related to the liability per potential retiree. The second
variable is the amount that the state’s revenue exceeded
the state’s expenditures in 2007 divided by the state’s
population. This “net income per person” indicates the
resources available to the state to pay healthcare fees.
States that keep expenses lower than revenues have more
financial flexibility and thus may be able to provide
more healthcare to their employees. “Net income per
person” is expected to be positively related to the
liability per potential retiree. The third variable is the
unfunded pension liability per potential retiree. If the
Science Publications
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to trim pensions and benefits, it is assumed that unions still
have a positive impact on the amount of healthcare
insurance provided. Therefore, states with higher union
representation should have higher healthcare liabilities per
potential retiree because they offer more generous plans.
To further explore differences in coverage provided,
the amount of pension liability per potential retiree is
also included in the model. It is assumed that states with
generous pension plans will offer generous healthcare
plans. Both the percent of potential retirees covered
under a collective bargaining agreement and the pension
liability per potential retiree should be positively related
to the OPEB liability. Descriptive statistics for the
variables discussed above, their sources and their
expected sign are reported in Table 2.

As shown in Table 2, there is a wide variation in
most variables. This table indicates there is little
consistency among the states with regards to how much
they owe in OPEB liabilities, the assumptions made
which are the basis of these liabilities and to the amount
they contribute towards the healthcare liabilities.
To examine what factors influence a state’s reported
OPEB liability, the following regression is used:
OPEB/potential retiree = healthcare assumption +
potential retiree+ potential retiree /population + %
change in # employees + per capita income + “net
income” / population + unfunded pension/potential
retiree + contributions/potential retiree + premium costs
+ percent unionized + pension liability/potential retiree.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Variable
Open liab/ potential retirees
Healthcare assumption
Potential retirees
Potential retirees /population
Percent change employees
Per capita income
Net income/population
Unfunded pension retirees
Contribution/potential retirees
Premium costs
Unionization
Pension liability potential retirees
Number of state employees
Number of retirees
OPEB liability
Health care assumption
Population
Percentage of change in employees
Per capita income
State revenues
Unfunded pension
Contributions
Percent unionized
Pension liability

Expected sign mean
+
-

Mean
Std Dev.
Min
Max
$57,673
$ 54,964
$ 2,379
$ 226,999
0.0923
0.015
0.06
0.136
183,503
188,025
22,501
1,000,038
0.035
0.017
0.019
0.128
0.0526
0.045
-0.027
0.0143
+
$37,632
$ 7,452
$ 3,229
$ 54,397
+
$1,384
$ 7,840
$ 243
$ 5,436
$70,814
$ 44,243
$ 2,230
$ 5,436
+
$1,624
$ 1,633
$$ 6,816
+
$12,896
$ 928
$ 10,969
$ 14,723
+
38%
18%
11%
73%
+
$298,167
$ 97,346
$ 171,719
$ 648,543
Full-time employees -2009 annual survey of public employment and payroll-U.S census bureau
Number of state employees retirees 2001-2002-U.S census bureau
OPEB liability for 2009-PEW center on the states-the widening gap April 2011
Individual state’s 2009 CAFRs
2009 resident population by state U.S census bureau
Full time employees -2005 annual survey of public employees and payroll U.S census bureau
Per capita personal income by state for 2009-U.S census bureau
Total revenue by state 2007 U.S. census bureau
Dollar amount of the state pension that is unfunded is 2009 -PEW center on the states the widening gap April 2011
2009 contributions made by the states towards their OPEB-REW center on the states the widening gap April 2011
Percent of public employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement 2010 current population survey
2009 total pension liability for state employees -REW center on the state the widening gap April 2011

Table 3. Regression results
Coefficients
Intercept
-50058.466010000
Health assump 2009
-886045.592800000
Potential retirees
0.045862346
#Emp+ret/pop
192185.842500000
Percentage of Change
143512.689300000
Per capita income
0.485695639
Net income per capita
-9.917287242
Unfunded pen/emp+ret
0.342123436
Contrib/employee+ret
24.186699650
Premium costs
10.393861090
Percent unionized
39.474047150
Pen liab/emp+ret
-0.123307890
R square 0.855351335; Observations; 45
Science Publications

Standard error
75638.957690000
299850.387500000
0.023996770
565621.693700000
98016.970930000
0.665241276
9.185804774
0.108568916
3.033630074
5.277396993
251.288133600
0.061610156
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t Stat
-0.661807983
-2.954958972
1.911188315
0.339778061
1.464161644
0.730104485
-1.079631833
3.151209853
7.972857290
1.969505251
0.157086793
-2.001421631

P-value
0.5126894710
0.0057317910
0.0646986760
0.7361768460
0.1526117090
0.4704778670
0.2881340880
0.0034485060
3.3869E-0900
0.0573373130
0.8761336320
0.0536254472
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Where:
Potential retirees

=

% change in employees =

Net income / population =

income and higher “net income per capita” will offer
better healthcare plans causing higher liabilities per
potential retiree. The model also predicts that states with
large unfunded pension liabilities will have lower
healthcare liabilities per potential retiree. The results
show that neither the wealth of the state’s taxpayers as
measured by per capita income nor the state’s fiscal
restraint as measured by “net income per capita”
influence the level of liabilities reported. However, the
results are significant regarding unfunded pensions per
potential employee. It was assumed that states with
difficulties funding pension plans would not have the
ability to finance large OPEB liabilities. Instead, the
results indicate that states that don’t fund their
pensions also incur large liabilities for healthcare. It
seems that states with pension problems also have
problems with large OPEB liabilities. However,
contribution per potential retire is positively related to
the liability per potential retiree. In 2009, states with
higher liabilities per potential retiree contributed more
towards their OPEB liabilities. These results indicate
that governments who promise a lot of healthcare
benefits are trying to fund the liabilities. States with
large, unfunded pension liabilities seem to be trying to
avoid the same mistakes with these newly reported
healthcare liabilities.
The fourth factor examined is the cost of healthcare
faced by the states. The results show premium costs are
positively related to the reported liability. The cost of
insurance premiums is used to proxy for the cost of
healthcare in the state. States with higher premiums and
thus higher healthcare costs have higher liabilities per
potential retirees. These results are logical and consistent.
The fifth factor examined is the level of benefits
provided to total potential retirees. Information on the
level of benefits provided to employees is not available
on a state by states basis. Therefore, the percentage of
the workforce that operates under a collective bargaining
agreement and the pension liability per potential retiree
proxy for the level of healthcare benefits offered to
retirees. Unionization is not significantly related to the
liability while pension liability is negatively related.
These results indicate that unionization does not impact
the level of healthcare benefits given. However, the
results indicate that states with more generous pension
plans have less generous healthcare plans. It is possible
that states are trading off pension benefits with
healthcare benefits when providing retirement coverage
to employees. The results may also indicate that it is
easier to change healthcare coverage through increased
co-pays than it is to change pension plans.

Number
of
state
employees+ number of
state retirees
Percent change in number
of state employees from
2005-2009
(State
revenue-state
expenditures)/population

The results are presented in Table 3.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results indicate that six of the variables
examined are significantly related to the OPEB liability
yet not always in the direction expected. The first factor
examined is the OEPB liability itself. The healthcare
inflation rate assumed is significant but not in the
predicted direction. Mathematically, the higher the
assumed healthcare inflation rate, the higher the liability
but the results show that governments with high
liabilities per potential retiree are assuming lower
healthcare costs. The wide range in predicted healthcare
inflation rates (6-13%) indicate either there is a wide
variance in state’s ability to control future healthcare
costs or that states are having difficulty in determining
what healthcare costs are going to do in the future. It
may also indicate that governments with higher
healthcare assumptions maybe over estimating their
healthcare liabilities which builds slack into their
reported numbers. States with lower assumptions may
be underreporting their liabilities. It would behoove
state legislatures to examine the assumptions that
underlie the reported liability to understand how the
reported liability is dependent upon the underlying
assumptions and verify that the assumptions represent
economic reality.
The second factor examined is economies of scale.
The results indicate that states do not enjoy economies of
scale when reporting healthcare liabilities. States with a
larger number of potential retirees face a higher OPEB
liability per potential retiree. No evidence of economies
of scales exists when negotiating healthcare costs; in fact,
the results indicate the opposite. These results indicate
that the political clout of large numbers of covered
employees ensure better benefits to the employees
themselves rather than cost savings for the state.
The third factor examined is the states’ ability to
pay. It is predicted that states with higher per capital
Science Publications
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that has only recently appeared on state and local
government’s financial statements. It is possible that the
wide range in healthcare assumptions accurately reflect
the underlying liability. It is also possible that the wide
range in assumptions reflect the newness in reporting the
OPEB liability and the difficulty in predicting future
healthcare costs. Either way, users of the states’
financial statements should be aware of the variance
among the states when making predictions as to future
healthcare costs and the impact these predictions have on
the reported numbers.

In summary, states with higher healthcare
liabilities per potential retiree contribute more to their
healthcare liabilities and assume lower rates of
increases in healthcare costs. They have a larger
number of potential retirees and lower pension
liabilities but these pension liabilities are more likely to
be underfunded. These states also face higher costs for
the healthcare coverage they provide.

4. CONCLUSION
This study finds that several factors influence the
OPEB liability per potential retiree. States that cover a
larger number of employees have higher liabilities per
potential retiree. The large number of state employees,
past and present, appears to be using their political clout
to accrue better healthcare benefits for themselves rather
than the states accruing the benefits of large numbers
through lower costs per person. Next, states with high
pension liabilities per person have lower healthcare
liabilities per person while states with high unfunded
pension liabilities per person have higher healthcare
liabilities per person.
These results indicate two
different things. Firstly, it appears that states make
tradeoffs. States that offer generous pension plans offer
less generous healthcare plans. However, states that
have problems with their pension plans because they are
underfunded appear to be compensating by offering
more healthcare coverage. All these results are
interesting but further analysis is necessary. The states
are currently in a time of flux regarding their retirement
benefits. Examining these results again in a few years
will be intriguing to see what changes have been made to
state retirement benefits.
One of the most important contributions of this
study is the examination of the assumed healthcare
inflation rate. So far, no other study has examined this
assumption as made by the states. The relationship
between actuarial assumptions and pension liabilities has
been studied but little research has looked at the
relationship between actuarial assumptions and the
liability reported for the cost of providing healthcare to
retirees. Recall the estimates ranged from 6% to over
13% in 2009. This wide range of estimates calls into
question whether the OPEB liabilities currently being
reported by the states represents the “true” costs of these
liabilities. When examining the fiscal health of the
states, it is important to accurately measure the
obligations the states have made to their employees.
Retirees’ healthcare costs are another “hidden” liability
Science Publications
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